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2Anthony W. Cyrnak*
One-bank holding companies offer numerousfinancial and organiza-
tional advantages to bank owners. To achieve holding company status,
however, the owners must satisJY Federal Reserve standards that involve
financial, managerial, legal, and antitrust considerations. This paper
examines the Federal Reserve's efforts to foster more competitive local
banking markets through the application ofa particular antitrustpolicy.
It is concluded that the Federal Reserve's efforts have been largely
successful.
The one-bankholding company has been a popu-
lar form of bank ownership for the past 15 years.
From 1970 through 1985 nearly 7,000 applications
to form such companies were filed with the Federal
Reserve System. Approximately 98 percentofthese
applications have been approved. Those few
applications, however, which were denied by the
Federal Reserve were most often disapproved for
financial, managerial, or legal reasons. In a small
number of cases since 1977, however, disapproval
has stemmed from competitive factors.
These competition-related cases were disap-
proved as part of what has been referred to as the
Board's "chain bank" policy. Chain banking is a
form ofbank ownership in which control ofat least
two banks is vested in a single individual oragroup
ofindividuals. Occurringfor the first time inthe late
nineteenth century, chainbanking was a response to
the restrictive branching laws of certain north-
western and southern agricultural states. Unable to
establish branches throughout counties or across
county lines, bankers who sought to expand the
geographic scope of their operations simply
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acquired banks in different locations. Becausethese
acquisitions were made by individuals rather than
corporations, they were largely immune to formal
antitrust review until the passage of the Change in
Bank Control Act of 1978. As a result, many
bankers acquired more than one bank within indi-
vidual banking markets and frequently induced
important anticompetitive effects.
The Federal Reserve Board began to examine the
antitrust implications ofsomechainbanking owner-
ship patterns when owners ofchain banks sought to
place their banks into one-bank holding companies
during the 1970s. The Board's analysis of these
formations has typically been conducted in two
stages. The first is an assessmentofany competitive
effects that could arise from placing the target bank
into a one-bank holding company (this portion of
the competitive assessment has almost always been
a pro forma matter since the formation usually is
merely a corporate reorganization). The second
phase of the analysis consists of examining the
competitive effects ofany affiliation that the target
bank may have formed with other banks in the same
geographic banking market in the past. For exam-
ple, assume that bank A, which has been in opera-
tion more than five years, applied to form a one-
bank holding company in year t. Assume furtherthatbank A's ownerhad in someearlieryear, say t-5,
acquired bank B a bank located in the same
geographic market. Since bank A and bank B had
been competitors before the acquisition, common
ownership in year t-5 would have eliminated the
competition that had existed. Ifthis anticompetitive
effect is judged to have been substantially adverse
with no outweighing benefits offulfillment ofcom-
munity convenience and needs, the Board would
normally deny the holding company application in
year t even though this corporate reorganization
generated no further anticompetitive effects.
The Board's rationale for denying such cases is
twofold and is clearly stated in a number of Board
orders. One, the chain bank policy is intended to
prevent the use ofthe holding company mechanism
to further what already is an anticompetitive
arrangement. Two, it is believed that denying such
applications will encourage the eventual disaffilia-
tion ofthe chain banks and thereby promote a more
competitive market structure.
The study in this article examines the Board's
chain bank policy as it has been implemented since
the first chain bank case was denied in 1977. Such
an investigation is of interest despite the small
number of cases involved because it provides an
avenue for investigating the effectiveness of a spe-
cific policy in an area in which the Federal Reserve
has a regulatory responsibility.
Part one ofthe study examines the level of bank
holding company formation activity during recent
years and discusses some of the advantages and
disadvantages of this type of bank ownership. Part
two defines the chain bank issue as delineated by the
Board and presents an analysis of those cases that
have been denied under this policy. Part three pres-
ents evidence with respect to the incidenceofsubse-
quent chain bank divestitures and thus "tests" the
effectiveness ofthe Board's policy.
An important conclusion developed in part three
of this study is that the advantages of the holding
company - especially certain tax advantages -
provide a strong incentive to form such companies.
This conclusion is supported by evidence that dem-
onstrates that bank owners are willing to go to
considerable lengths to achieve holding company
status for their banks. Some observations on the
Board's more recent implementation of the chain
bank policy are also presented. The final section
summarizes the study.
I. One-Bank Holding Companies:
Advantages and Disadvantages
The popularity of the bank holding company
(BHC) as a form of bank ownership has increased
steadily since 1970. Table 1 demonstrates that the
number of approved formations has increased in
each of most of the years between 1970 and 1985,
with formation activity reaching a peak in 1982.
Overall, from 1970 through 1985, the number of
BHC formation applications filed with the Federal
Reserve System amounted to 6,899. 1
The large number of BHC applications suggests
that the advantages ofthe BHC form ofbank owner-
ship outweigh any disadvantages. These advan-
tages, moreover, are broad-based and relate to an
organization's ability to engage in nonbanking
activities, its ability to expand geographically, the
degree ofcontrol it can exercise over its own corpo-
rate ownership, and the firm's financial flexibility.
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Since 1970, when amendments to the Bank Hold-
ing Company Act of1956 were enacted, BHCs have
engaged in a growing number of nonbanking
activities. These include, butare not limited to, such
activities as mortgage banking, consumer finance,
leasing, data processing, courier services, certain
management consulting activities, and merchant of
futures commissions. BHC entry into many ofthese
product markets has beenextensive and has afforded
many BHCs an important opportunity for diver-
sification.
BHCs can also provide a convenient vehicle for
geographic expansion in states that have restrictive
branching laws. States that permit BHC expansion
generally allow BHC acquisitions on anunre-
stricted, statewide basis. Thus, BHe acquisitions
can produce nearly the same degree of geographicdiversity as branchingoperations whilepreserving a
high degree of local autonomy (through the reten-
tion oflocal officers and directors in the acquired
bank).
Another advantage of the .BHC form of·bank
ownership is the ability to exercise considerable
control over corporate ownership. For example, the
formation ofa BHCprovides the majorityowners of
theproposed banksubsidiarywith anopportunityto
eliminateminority shareholderswithinthe bankand
thus consolidate theircontrolofthe bankingorgani-
zation. This canbe accomplished byforcing minor-
ity shareholders to acceptcash (rather than shares of
the forming BHC) for their bank shares. Certain
regulations also give BHCs more flexibility than
banks in incorporating anti-takeover measures into
their corporate structure. BHCs, for example, have
the ability to repurchase their own stock.
The BHC form ofbank ownership also provides
important financial flexibility. This flexibility
derives from several sources. BHCs, for example,
mayenjoyanadvantageinraisingnewcapitalandin
structuring existing capital. Under present Federal
Reserve standards, rules for including certain items
as capital (such as equity commitment notes and
intangible assets) are more liberal for BHCs than
they are for banks. Also, certain BHCs (generally
those with less than $150 million of assets) can
engage in "double leveraging," in which funds
borrowedbythe parent company(debt) are "pushed
down" to the subsidiary bank as equity capital.
Another very important financial benefit associ-
ated with the BHC form relates to the tax treatment
ofcertain income andexpenses.2 One area in which
these considerations are particularly important is
the retirement of bank acquisition debt. Typically,
personal debt is employed when an individual pur-
chases a bank. The bank's owner usually retires this
debt with bank dividend payments that accrue to
him as ownerofthe bank. Dividendpayments to the
owner, however, are taxable as ordinary income.
Thus, some portion ofthe dividend payments to the
owner are "lost" to taxes and cannot be fully
applied to debt retirement. All other things being
equal, the amount of bank dividends that must be
paid to service the acquisition debt will begreaterin
the case ofindividual ownership- in which "after-
tax" dollars are being used to retire debt - than if
all bank dividends went directly to debt retirement.
The creation of a one-bank holding company,
however, enables all bank dividends to go toward
debt retirement and thus effectively reduces the
amount ofdividend payments a bank must make in
order to retire a given amount of acquisition debt.
7Typically, whenthe newly formed holding company
"buys" the owner's bank, the BHC also agrees to
assume the owner's acquisition debt as part of the
purchase price ofthe bank. The source offunds to
retire this debt remains, as in thecase ofthe individ-
ual owner, bank dividends. A critical difference
now, however, is that bankdividend payments to the
BHC are (by IRS regulations) tax-free income to the
BHC. Thus, the BHC can use the entire stream of
bankdividends to retire acquisition debt. Thatis, no
bankdividendpaymentsare "lost" to tax payments.
The amount of bank dividends that must be paid
in orderto retire agiven amountofdebt, therefore, is
less when the debt is retired by a BHC than when it
is retired by an individual. Because the holding
company can retire the acquisition debt with essen-
tially tax-free dollars, the debt servicing burden on
the bank is significantly less than if an individual
retired debt with dollars on which he must pay
income taxes.
A second important tax advantage of the BHC
form is related to the ability of a BHC to file a
consolidated tax return (combined parent company
and bank subsidiary), and is known as the "tax-
expense" benefit. Typically, bank subsidiary divi-
dend payments to the parent company BHC (for
small, undiversified holding companies) comprise
the sole source of income to the parent holding
company. These dividend payments, as noted ear-
lier, are tax-free income to the parent holding com-
pany. Thus, the parent company has actual cash
income but no taxable income (that is, it has a
taxable income base of zero). The parent holding
company, however, usually has tax-deductible
expenses in the form of interest payments on
acquisition debt assumed upon the purchase of its
subsidiary bank. This combination of zero taxable
income but positive deductible interest expenses
generates a negative income tax liability for many
small parent companies.
Without positive taxable income, however, the
parent company cannot take advantage of its nega-
tive tax liability. By filing a consolidated tax return
with a subsidiary bankthathas apositive income tax
liability, the parent company can effectively reduce
the income tax liability of the overall organization
by an amount equal to the subsidiary bank's margi-
nal tax rate times the parent company's interest
expense.
Typically, the subsidiary bank pays the parent
company the value of this benefit. In the end,
however, the subsidiary bank will not have incurred
any greater total cash outlay than if the bank were
owned individually. However, the holding company
has additional cash which it may use to retire debt.
Compared to these substantial advantages, the
disadvantages ofthe BHC form ofbank ownership
seem minor. Among the disadvantages are start-up
and organizational costs which entail professional
fees, franchise taxes, and staffing costs. In addition,
the regulatory process itself imposes some costs
upon the principalsofproposedBHCs in the form of
reporting requirements and greater regulatory scru-
tiny. These disadvantages notwithstanding, it is
clear from Table 1 that the BHC is a form of bank
ownership that many bank owners have chosen to
adopt.
II. The Chain Bank Issue
The formation of a BHC requires the prior
approval ofthe Federal Reserve System pursuant to
Section 3(a)(l) of the Bank Holding Company
Act.3 Table 1shows that all but 132 (two percent) of
the 6,899 applications filed from 1970through 1985
were approved. An examination of the formations
that were denied reveals that most were disapproved
for financial, managerial, or legal reasons. Twelve
of the proposed formations, however, were denied
for competitivereasons as partoftheBoard's "chain
bank" policy, discussed earlier. (See Table 2). 4
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To reiterate, the Board's rationale for scrutinizing
the competitive effects of one-bank holding com-
pany formations among commonly owned banks is
that the BHC vehicle should not be used to further
an anticompetitive arrangement, and that denial of
suchcases might lead to aprocompetitiverestructur-
ing ofthe affected banking markets by precipitating
a dissolution ofcommon ownership. This rationale
was clearly stated in the Mahaska decision, the first
ofthe chain bank denials:Section 3(c) of the Bank Holding Company
Act requires the Board to consider whether
any proposed acquisition by a bank holding
company (1) would further the monopoliza-
tion.or attempted monopolization ofa bank-
ing market, or (2) may substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly in
any banking market. Where, as here, a pro-
posed acquisition involves the use ofa hold-
ing company by a group of individuals to
acquire control ofa bank that is a competitor
of another bank under the control of essen-
tially the sameindividuals, the Boardbelieves
it must apply these standards. In the Board's
view, the subject proposal presents a compel-
ling case where the holding company is being
used to further an anticompetitive arrange-
ment.
While denial of the proposal may not imme-
diately result in.a complete termination ofthe
present situation . . . it would preserve the
distinctpossibility that [the targetbank] could
againbecome an independent organization in
thefuture. Approval, on the otherhand would
almost certainly foreclose that possibility
since, as a result ofthe flexibility afforded by
the holding company structure, Applicant
would appearcapable ofservicing its acquisi-
tion debt, and, in addition, a mutuality of
interest between the affiliate and [the target
bank] would likely be established.s
When implemented in 1977, this method ofana-
lyzing the competitive effects ofone-bank holding
company formations clearly constituted a new
approach to the Board's scrutiny ofone-bank hold-
9ing company fonnations. 6 Itwas not clear, however,
that the Board's approach to these cases would be
beyond legal challenge, particularly in view of a
related legal decision rendered in 1977. In that
decision the Board's denial of a one-bank holding
company formation on the basis offinancial factors
(First Lincolnwood) was overturned in district court
on the argumentthat". . . inorderto be grounds for
disapproval, the condition or tendency deemed not
to be in the public interest must be caused or
enhanced by the proposed transaction."7
In a second competitive chain bank denial which
quickly followed Mahaska, however, the Board
argued that the First Lincolnwood decision did not
apply because (l) First Lincolnwood related to
aspects other than competitive factors; (2) consum-
mation of the current holding company fonnation
proposal is related to competitive (not financial)
factors and would enhance and further an anticom-
petitive arrangement; and (3) evasion of the Bank
Holding Company Act would be facilitated and
encouraged.
Any uncertainty regarding whether chain bank
cases could be legally denied did not exist for long.
In 1978, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the
Board's authority to deny one-bank holding com-
pany formations even though the fonnations did not
exacerbate pre-existing financial factors. 8 This 1978
decision clearly established the Board's authority to
deny one-bank fonnations for adverse financial and
managerial factors. Itwas also seen as confinnation
of the Board's authority to deny formations on the
basis ofcompetitive factors as well. Any remaining
doubt on this point was removed in 1980 when the
only legal challenge to a Board competitive chain
bank denial was rejected in court.9
Characteristics of Chain Bank Denials
From 1977 to 1981, the Board denied twelve
proposed fonnations for reasons relating to the
competitiveeffects ofpast affiliations. These twelve
cases, listed in Table 2, are examined more closely
below to review the competitive factors in question.
Some ofthe data relating to the cases are presented
in Table 3.
10Several important observations can be made from
this information. First, virtually all of the target
banks involved in the twelve denials were small
banks located in small, primarily rural banking
markets. The smallest of the target banks (Can-
eyville) had depositsofonly $7.1 million at the time
ofapplication. Even the largest (Lake Jackson) had
only $36.2 million ofdeposits. For the entire group
of twelve banking organizations, the average bank
size amounted to $16.0 million.
The markets in which these banks operated were
likewise small and contained few banking competi-
tors. Five of the cases, for example, involved mar-
kets with five or fewer banking organizations. Six
other markets had between six and ten banking
organizations, and only one application involved a
market with more than ten banking organizations.
Similarly, the total deposits of the twelve markets
averaged only $144 million.
Themarkets in which these twelve organizations
operated also were, in all but one case, highly
c()ncentrated at the time of application. Eleven of
the twelve markets had four-firm concentration
ratios higher than 75 percent and a Herfindahl-
Hirschmann Index in excess of 1800. 10 Only one
case (Lake Jackson) involved a market ofmoderate
concentration.
The profile, then, that emerges of the banks and
markets in these cases is one ofsmall banks operat-
ing in small, highly concentrated markets. Within
such markets, it is not difficult to imagine that past
multiple acquisitions ofbanks couldhave resulted in
significant anticompetitive effects.
An Analysis ofthe Denials
Data related to the anticompetitive effects of the
twelve denials are presented in Table 4. Among the
most obvious and most important aspects of these
cases is that the target bank and its affiliate(s)
accounted for a relatively large market share of
deposits at the time the common ownership of
shares (anticompetitive affiliation) occurred. Eleven
of the twelve applications, for example, involved
affiliations in which the combined market share was
greater than 24 percent. Only one proposal (Eicher)
involved a market share combination oflesser mag-
11nitude. Denial of this application resulted from
unfavorable financial as well as competitive factors.
The average combined market share for all twelve
applications was 44 percent, ranging from a low of
13.0 percent (Eicher) to a high of 100 percent
(Childress).
Eightofthe twelve proposalsinvolvedaffiliations
of four years or less (Table 5). In two cases (Welch
and Serno), however, common ownership had been
in effect for more than 20 years prior to the applica-
tion to form a BHC.
The duration ofthe anticompetitive affiliations in
these cases was of considerable interest to the
Board. In particular, it was believed by some Board
membersthat there was littlelikelihoodofdisaffilia-
tion in those cases where the period of common
ownership was lengthy. Thus, it was argued, denial
would have little chance of precipitating a subse-
quent procompetitive divestiture. Chairman Paul
Volcker and Governor Lyle Gramley voiced this
concern in the Welch application:
We do not believe that denial ofthis applica-
tion at this time will increase the probability
that common control ofthe two banks will be
terminated. Thecombinedmarketshareofthe
two banks is certainly substantial, and we
would join the majority of the Board if there
was some reasonable possibility that denial
might result in severance of this relatllJmmrp.
The duration of this relationship is signifi-
cantly longer than in any application pre-
viously denied by the Board on com-
petitive grounds, however, and thus it appears
unlikely that denial would have any meaning-
ful effect.
Similarly, GovernorLyleGramley stated in the First
Southeast proposal:
The affiliation between Kenosha, West Ken-
osha, and Silver Lake Banks has spanned
nearly a decade. Denial in any ofthese cases
would not increase significantly the proba-
bility that common control ofthe three banks
will be terminated . . . so that the prospects
for disaffiliation seem small.
The issue ofthe likelihood ofdivestiture in these
applications raises the question of whether the
Board's chain bank policy in general has been
effective in promoting subsequent divestitures.
Also, how soon following denial did the divesti-
tures, ifany, take place; and was divestiture related
to the length of the affiliation? Answers to these
questions are presented in the next section. They
provide some evidence as to the overall effective-
ness ofthe Board's chain bank policy.
12III. Divestitures
Forevidenceonthe incidenceofdivestitures, this
study examined Federal Reserve records andinter-
viewed individuals associated with the twelve
denied applications.•The results of these inquiries
are presentedinTable 6. Thedatarevealthatdivesti-
tures subsequently occurred in eleven ofthe twelve
The only application· in.which no
divestiture wasrecorded was First Southeast,and,
in that instance, the commonly owned banks later
merged. In several instances (for example, Citizens,
Mahaska, and Mid-Nebraska), subsequentapplica-
tions by the resulting nonaffiliated banks to form
BHCs were refiled and approved by the Board
following divestiture.
relatively short time after denial. In three of the
twelve cases (Citizens, Caneyville, andChildress), a
divestiture was made within six months or less. In
four others (Eicher, First State, Lake Jackson, and
Welch), the time to divestiture was less than 24
months. In only four applications (Midwest, Mid-
Nebraska, Mahaska, and Serno) was the divestiture
period significantly longer (45 months to 60
months). The average time from denial to divestiture
was 27 months, orjustoverZ years.
It is not P?SsibletoaccountfuIIy for the motiva-
tions behill<lthe divestitures that occurred. A bank
owner's willingness to sell a bankdepends upon any
number offactors including the terms ofpun;hase,
availability ofpurchasers, and the presence ofreg-
ulatory barriers. However, the most likely explana-
tionfpr such a broadly based result ~a92p¢tc¢nt
rate ofdivestiture (II of 12) - is that the laqk of
holding company status prevented the owners of
these banks from realizing the important benefits of
BHCstatus discussed earlier.
In particular, a lack of BHC status would have
prevented the realization of important debt-servic-
ing tax benefits-.afact ofsome importance given
that, in all Cases that were denied, the proposed
purchase of the bank involved the immediate or
planned assumption of debt. 11 Since the Board's
denial prevented the parties from realizing tax bene-
fits, the principals of the banks appear to have
decided that continued common ownership of the
affiliated banks was a less favorable proposition
than BHC status.
Recent Board Policy on Chain Cases
Since the First Southeast case in 1981, the Board
has not denied a chain bank case. There are several
possible explanations for this absence of denials.
One is thatbankingantitruststandards have e~sed as
the result ofimportant banking legislation. Specifi-
cally, boththe Depository Institutions Deregulation
and Monetary Control Act of1980 and the Garn-St
GermainDepository Institutions Act of 1982 have
13strengthened the argument that thrift institutions
should be regarded as partial or full competitors of
commercial banks. Counting thrift institutions as
competitors increases the total number of "bank-
ing" competitors and thereby lowers concentration
within markets. Thus, the competitiveeffects ofany
horizontal affiliation are likely to be less severe.
Two otherdevelopments have also served to limit
denials under the Board's chain bank policy in
recent years. The first arose in a 1983 chain bank
application involving an affiliation ofmore than 40
years. In that case, the Board suggested that bank
affiliations established before the passage of the
Bank Merger Act of 1960 might appropriately be
exempted from antitrust review. 12 Reviewing the
effects ofaffiliations established before that year, it
was argued, would unfairly apply antitrust stan-
dards that were created subsequentto the affiliation.
This proposition was reiterated and expanded some-
what in a second approval decision made by the
Board in 1983:
The duration ofthe affiliation here is 24 years
and did not represent an attempt to evade the
antitrust laws or the BHC Act. Common
control was effected in 1959, before the Cel-
ler-Kefauver Antimerger Act of 1950 was
believed to apply to bank mergers; before the
enactment of the Bank Merger Act of 1960,
which required regulatory agencies to take
competitive factors into account in approving
mergers; and before the enactment of the
Bank MergerActof1966, which clarified the
applicability of the antitrust laws to bank
mergers. 13
A final contribution to the approval ofchain bank
cases in recent years has been the Change in Bank
Control Act of 1978. This law, which embodies a
competitive standard equivalent to that of the BHC
Act, requires that changes in the effective owner-
ship orcontrol ofa bank receive prior approval from
one of the three federal bank regulatory agencies.
Thus, seriously anticompetitive affiliations of the
type which raise a chain bank issue presumably
have not occurred since the passage ofthis law. As a
result, the pool of potential chain bank cases has
shrunk since 1978. 14
IV. Summary and Conclusion
Beginning in 1977, the Board forged a rather
well-defined policy with respect to the formation of
bank holding companies from chain banks. This
policy requires an assessment of the competitive
effects of any prior affiliations between the target
bank and other banks located in the same banking
market. If the original affiliation had substantially
adverse effects on competition within the relevant
geographic market, the Board will normally deny
the formation application based upon the require-
ments of the Bank Holding Company Act. The
Board's purpose in applying the standards of the
Ban.I<. Holding Company Act to these chain bank
cases is twofold: to prevent the use of the holding
company vehicle to further an anticompetitive
arrangement and to promote conditions under
which the anticompetitive chain affiliation might be
dissolved in the future.
From 1977 to 1981, the Board denied 12 chain
bank applications. The target banks involved in
these applications were nearly all small institutions
located in rural, concentrated markets. An exam-
14
ination of these 12 cases revealed that the Board's
chain bankpolicy was highly effective. Procompeti-
tive divestitures occurred in eleven of the twelve
cases.
The Board has not denied any chain bank cases
since 1981 for several reasons, including a general
easing of banking antitrust standards, a determina-
tion that pre-1960 affiliations should be exempted
from antitrust review, and the effects ofthe Change
in Bank Control Act. However, the experience of
1977-81 and the subsequent divestitures to gain
BHC status suggest strongly that the BHC form of
ownership enjoys decided advantages. Among the
most important ofthese is the ability to service debt
more advantageously than an individual. Other
important advantages of the holding company
include the ability to engage in certain nonbanking
activities and, in some cases, to expand geograph-
ically in ways not available through normal bank
branching. Greater flexibility in structuring capital,
ownershipand control, and anti-takeoverprovisions
also derive from the holding company form and
provide important additional benefits.FOOTNOTES
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